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CINCPAC



COMMAND HISTORY

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Nuclear Weapons Deployment and Security

(TS FRD) Deployment of nuclear weapons outside the Continental United States, and the continuing requirement to assure the security of such weapons, were matters of CINCPAC interest in 1974. In the summer, the JCS requested that requirements for nuclear weapons deployment be reevaluated in the context of special concern for the security of those weapons. CINCPAC provided the following proposals. First was the phase out of nuclear antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, and atomic demolition munitions, retaining air launched and surface-to-surface weapons. He also proposed to limit the forward deployment of remaining weapons to Korea, Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and forces afloat. He proposed to plan for phasing the weapons out of Korea as the Korean security situation permitted.³

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1. CINCPAC 040406 May 74; JCS 8787/122156Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 222125Z Jun 74; J311 HistSum Jun 74.
 2. J311 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPACAF 292300Z Nov 74.
 3. J320 HistSum Aug 74.

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(S) In September, the Chairman of the JCS expressed his concern that extensive media coverage of statements by public figures concerning security of stored nuclear weapons could trigger some act, possibly by some irrational individual or individuals, against a nuclear weapons storage site. He believed it prudent to recognize this potentially increased risk and take appropriate precautionary measures. "We should be particularly careful that our discussions with the media and with visitors do not add fuel to the fire."¹

(S) CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commands, as well as Washington agencies, that he shared the concern expressed by the Chairman. "PACOM has its share of irrational people as shown by recent destruction of airliner in flight in RVN and murder of Mrs. Park. Commanders should review procedures and precautions to protect against terrorist threat of type represented by above actions."²

1974. (S-FRD) Following a tour of the PACOM by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS of the results of that trip. The Assistant Secretary had found no immediate problems with physical security, but he raised several significant questions concerning nuclear posture. He believed that nuclear weapons stored ashore in WESTPAC were well in excess of requirements. He also suggested reducing the number of nuclear storage sites in use. He cited differences in threat perception and/or response by component security guards, indicating that the Services lacked uniform threat specifics in training and governing directives. The emphasis was on procedures to prevent unauthorized access rather than the ability to defeat or repulse a carefully planned, aggressively executed terrorist attack. CINCPAC advised the Chairman that he had suggested that the Assistant Secretary discuss these matters with the JCS. While the staff was working on the entire nuclear weapon deployment problem, CINCPAC advised, he had tasked his Inspector General to inspect nuclear storage sites throughout the PACOM, emphasizing site security against violent attack.³

(TS-FRD) Certain specific movements of nuclear weapons occurred in 1974. All nuclear weapons from Tainan Air Base, Taiwan, were relocated to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Permissive Action Link (PAL) recode had been completed by 19 July. On 18 December CINCPACAF completed movement of 81 non-PAL weapons from Clark to CONUS. This action completed implementation of Category II of

1. JCS 6490/281717Z Sep 74.
2. CINCPAC 290120Z Sep 74. The wife of the President of Korea had been killed in an assassination attempt on her husband on 15 August.
3. CINCPAC 020436Z Oct 74; J320 HistSum Sep 74. See also Chapter I, Inspector General Activities, and Chapter VI, Communications Security and Nuclear Weapons Storage.

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the PAL Program in the PACOM, in which all nuclear weapons in the Philippines were to be PAL-equipped and locked.¹

(~~C-FRD~~) Certain Army weapons were also moved. On 19 November CINCUSARPAC initiated movement of 36 HONEST JOHN and 8 MADM from the Naval Magazine at Lualualei, Oahu, departing from Barbers Point to CONUS. Weapon movements were scheduled at night to preclude the crew duty day being exceeded, which, in turn, necessitated a crew rest of 15 hours and additional security forces to secure the aircraft during this period. Four logistic movements were programmed with 11 weapons per aircraft. The remaining 147 nuclear weapons were to be returned to CONUS not later than 30 June 1975.²

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