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# CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

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CJCSI 3110.04  
12 February 1996

NUCLEAR SUPPLEMENT TO JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN  
FOR FY 1996 (JSCP FY 96)

- References:
- a. Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP 92) (U)
  - b. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.01) (U)
  - c. DNA Report 3376F, "Nuclear Weapon Employment Constraints for the Control of Fallout (U)"
  - d. CJCSI 5119.01, "Charter for Centralized Direction, Management, Operation, and Technical Support of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications System (U)"

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T.S. No. 97-73  
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1. (U) Purpose. As directed by references a and b, this instruction provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services for preparing and coordinating plans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons. Additional guidance developed by the CINCs and Services and the resulting plans and procedures must comply with the guidance in this supplement.
2. (U) Cancellation. MCM-148-91, "Annex C (Nuclear) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan CY 1993-1995," Change 5, 1 August 1995, is canceled. Destroy canceled document in accordance with existing security directives. Certificates of destruction need not be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. (U) Applicability. This instruction applies to the CINCs, Services, Defense agencies, and Joint Staff.

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- 4. (U) Policy. Guidance provided here will be followed for the development or implementation of plans in accordance with reference b.
- 5. (U) Responsibilities. See Enclosure H.
- 6. (U) Definitions. See Enclosure I.
- 7. (U) Summary of Changes

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (S) [

c. (S) [

] (b) (1)

(1) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(2) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(3) (U) Consolidates existing guidance.

d. (S) [

] (b) (1)

- 8. (U) Effective Dates. CJCSI 3110.04 is effective for planning upon receipt. It applies to plans effective on or after 1 October 1996.
- 9. (U) Document Security. This cover letter is classified SECRET. Enclosures are classified as marked.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER KROSS  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

A--General

B--Weapon Deployment and Security

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C--General Employment Planning Guidance  
D--SIOP and NRF Employment Planning  
E--Theater Nuclear Planning  
F--Reconnaissance in Support of Nuclear Operations  
G--SIOP and NRF Review, Approval, and Analysis  
H--Responsibilities  
GL--Glossary

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B-1 thru B-4	O	H-1 thru H-14	O
C-1 thru C-10	O	GL-1 thru GL-22	O
D-1 thru D-30	O		

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ENCLOSURE A  
GENERAL (U)

1. (U) Purpose. This supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP FY-96) provides Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services for preparing and coordinating plans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons. Additional guidance developed by the CINCs and Services and the resulting plans and procedures must comply with the guidance in this supplement.

2. (U) Scope

a. (U) This supplement encompasses all nuclear weapon associated tasks assigned by the basic JSCP. It applies to the employment of all current and near-term nuclear forces and to the preparation of all US plans involving nuclear operations.

b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

c. (U) Nuclear weapon allocation and deployment authorizations are published separately.

d. (U) Unless otherwise directed, plans for the employment of nuclear weapons will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

3. (S) [ FOCUS (P. VII)

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] (b)(1)

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4. (U) Basic Employment Objectives

a. (U) The fundamental objective of US nuclear employment policy is to deter direct attack, particularly nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies. Deterrence is best achieved if US defense posture makes a Russian assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous that it removes any incentive for initiating attack.

b. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

c. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

d. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

5. (U) Required US Capabilities

a. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

✓ b. (U) US employment flexibility must provide the capability for responding effectively and appropriately to any situation in which nuclear weapons may need to be employed to achieve US objectives.



6. (S) [ FORCE READINESS PLANNING (P. VII) ]

(b)(1)

[

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A-4

Enclosure A

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ENCLOSURE B  
WEAPON DEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY (U)

1. (U) Deployment Concept

a. (S) [

b. (S) [

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] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

2. (U) NSNF Deployment and Reconstitution

a. (U) The Chiefs of the Services and CINCs will maintain NSNF deployment and reconstitution capabilities as follows:

(1) (S) [

(2) (S) [

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

b. (U) Theater CINCs, in coordination with the Services, USACOM, and USSTRATCOM, will develop and forward to the Chairman of the Joint

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Reason: 1.5(a)  
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Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, their plans for NSNF deployment/  
employment in accordance with Enclosure E of this supplement.

3. (U) Weapon Security. Each CINC and Service has responsibility for the  
storage and security of nuclear weapons deployed under their jurisdiction.

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

(1) (S) [

] (b)(1)

(2) (S) [

] (b)(1)

(3) (S) [

] (b)(1)

c. (S) [

] (b)(1)

d. (U) The welfare and safety of hostages will be considered in determining the actions to be taken for the protection or destruction of US nuclear weapons. However, the presence of hostages will not deter the taking of decisive, prompt, and effective action, including the use of deadly force to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.

e. (S) [

] (b)(1)

f. (S) [

] (b)(1)

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B-4

Enclosure B

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ENCLOSURE C

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) Scope. This section provides general planning guidance. Specific guidance for SIOP and NRF employment planning is contained in Enclosure D and for theater planning in Enclosure E.

2. (U) General. The fundamental objective for the employment of nuclear weapons is to deter direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States or its allies. Additionally, US nuclear weapons could deter the use of weapons of mass destruction and prevent or respond to aggression against the US and its allies. To fulfill this purpose:

a. (S) [

b. (S) [

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] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

3. (S) [ Planning Coordination (p. vii)

] (b)(1)

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

c. (S) [

] (b)(1)

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Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: X-4

d. (S) [

] (b)(1)

4. (S) Planning Factors (P. VII)

] (b)(1)

a. (U) USSTRATCOM is the executive agent for planning factors. USSTRATCOM will review nuclear planning factors provided by the Services (i.e., PLS, weapon system reliability, and accuracy factors for each nuclear designated weapon system) along with supporting methodology and rationale. Once reviewed, these planning factors can be used for planning the SIOP. For greater fidelity of theater nuclear option analysis, these planning factors may be used as the basis of initial option planning and revised as planning values and employment tactics become more refined. Reporting and analysis will be accomplished in accordance with USSTRATCOM Pre-Launch Survivability and Strategic Missile Operational Testing Guidelines. Copies of all reports will be provided to the Joint Staff and Services.

b. (U) The Joint Staff will provide USSTRATCOM with communication system reliability planning factors.

c. (U) Nuclear weapon system penetration capabilities will be determined by using programs developed by, or under the guidance of, USSTRATCOM in coordination with affected CINCs, Services, and the Director, DIA, as appropriate.

d. (U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review and approve all nuclear planning factors in conjunction with the USSTRATCOM Revision Report.

5. (U) Nuclear Execution

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (U) Combatant CINC Actions Upon Nuclear Execution

(1) (S) [

] (b)(1)



(2) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

(3) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

6. ~~(S)~~ [ NUCLEAR TERMINATION

a. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

b. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

(2) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

(3) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

(4) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b) (1)

] (b) (1)

(S) [ ]

] (b)(1)

7. (S) [ ] ESCALATION CONTROL (P. VII)

] (b)(1)

a. (S) [ ]

b. (S) [ ]

c. (S) [ ]

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

8. (U) Constraints

a. (S) [ ]

(1) (S) [ ]

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

(3) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

b. ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(1) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(a) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(b) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(c) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(2) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(3) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(4) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(5) (FS)

[

]

(b)(1)

Table C-1. (U) Global Monitor Points

c. (U) Prohibited Targets. Certain target categories are prohibited from attack in specific options.

(1) (FS)

[

] (b)(1)

(a) (FS)


[

(b) (FS)

[

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)



(3) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

d. (FS) [

] (b)(1)

(1) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

(2) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

(3) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

(4) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

(5) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

9. (S) [ RELOCATABLE TARGETS (P. VII)

] (b)(1)

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

c. (S) [

] (b)(1)

10. (U) Exceeding Limitations. Any deviations from the limitations provided in this supplement must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff. Notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff, immediately if this guidance criteria is exceeded or when military effectiveness is degraded.

C-9

Enclosure C

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C-10

Enclosure C

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Enclosure D  
SIOP AND NRF EMPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)  
PART I. SIOP PLANNING (U)

1. (S) [ SCOPE

] (b)(1)

a. (FS) [

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] (b)(1)

b. (FS) [

] (b)(1)

c. (U) Focus. MAOs and LAOs will allow the NCA to:

(1) (FS) [

(2) (FS) [

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

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Declassify on: X-4

(3) (TS)

(a) (S)

(b) (S)

(c) (S)

(d) (S)

2. (U) Force Commitment

a. (S)

S10P COMMITTED FORCES  
(S10P 97 WAR GAME, P. )

b. (S)

3. (TS) FORCE ALLOCATION AND APPLICATION (p. VII)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

4. (U) Target Development

a. (U) Target categories that must be attacked to achieve SIOP objectives include:

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

(2) ~~(S)~~ ]

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S)~~ [

(b)(1)

5. (U) Target Lists. USCINCSTRAT and appropriate CINCs will develop target lists from the TDI or similarly formatted DIA target-intelligence products.

a. (U) National Target Base (NTB)

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

(b)(1)

(2) (U) NTB Target Selection Guidance

(a) (U) Strategic Nuclear Forces

1. (TS)

2. (TS)

3. (TS)

4. (TS)

5. (TS)

6. (TS)

(b)(1)

(b) (U) Other Military and Supporting C<sup>3</sup>I

1. (TS)

(b)(1)

2. (TS)

3. (TS)

4. (TS)

(b)(1)

a. (TS)

(b)(1)

b. (TS)

(b)(1)

c. (TS)

5. (TS)

(b)(1)

- a. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- b. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- 6. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- a. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- b. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- 7. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- a. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- b. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- c. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- d. (TS) ] (b)(1)
- 8. (TS) ] (b)(1)

(c) (U) Leadership and Supporting C<sup>3</sup>I

1. (U) Installations housing:

a. ~~(S)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

c. ~~(S)~~

d. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

2. (U) Critical nodes or key elements of:

a. ~~(S)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

(d) ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(S)~~

a. ~~(S)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

c. ~~(S)~~

d. ~~(S)~~

e. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

2. (U) Critical nodes or key elements of the:

a. ~~(TS)~~

b. ~~(TS)~~

] (b)(1)

3. ~~(TS)~~

4. ~~(S)~~

a. ~~(TS)~~

b. ~~(TS)~~

] (b)(1)

(3) (U) NTB selection criteria will be specified in documentation supporting NTB production.

(4) ~~(S)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

] (b)(1)  
] (b)(1)

6. (U) Selection and Damage Level Guidance

a. ~~(TS)~~

] (b)(1)

[

(b)(1)

b. (FS) [

(b)(1)

c. (FS) [

(b)(1)

d. (FS) [

(b)(1)

(1) (FS)  
(2) (FS)  
(3) (FS)  
(4) (FS)

(b)(1)


e. (FS) [

(b)(1)

f. (S) [ (DAMAGE LEVELS  
SIOP 97 WNR GAME P. )

(b)(1)








Figure D-1. (U) MAO Structure  
~~(Top Secret)~~

- (1) ~~(TS)~~ [ ]
- (2) ~~(TS)~~ [ ]
- (3) ~~(TS)~~ [ ]
- (4) ~~(TS)~~ [ ]
- (5) ~~(TS)~~ [ ]
- c. ~~(TS)~~ [ ]

- ](b)(1)
- ](b)(1)
- ](b)(1)
- ](b)(1)
- ](b)(1)
- ](b)(1)

- (1) ~~(TS)~~
- (2) ~~(TS)~~
- (3) ~~(TS)~~
- (4) ~~(TS)~~
- (5) ~~(TS)~~
- d. ~~(TS)~~

(b)(1)

- (1) ~~(TS)~~
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
8. (U) MAO Targeting Guidance

- a. ~~(TS)~~
- (1) ~~(TS)~~
- (2) ~~(TS)~~

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



(b) (FS) [redacted]  
(c) (FS) [redacted]  
(d) (FS) [redacted]  
(8) (FS) [redacted]  
(9) (FS) [redacted]  
c. (FS) [redacted]  
(1) (FS) [redacted]  
(2) (FS) [redacted]


(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]  
(b) (1) [redacted]

- (3) ~~(S)~~
  - d. ~~(S)~~
  - (1) ~~(S)~~
  - (2) ~~(S)~~
  
  - (3) ~~(S)~~
  - (4) ~~(S)~~
  - (5) ~~(S)~~
  
  - (6) ~~(S)~~
- (b)(1)

9. (U) MAO Planning Guidance

a. (U) Force Readiness, Survivability, and Timing. USSTRATCOM will:

- (1) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]



~~(TOP SECRET)~~

Figure D-2. (U) SIOP Timing Plans

(5) (U) Use the following assumptions in planning MAOs:

- (a) ~~(S)~~
- (b) ~~(S)~~
- (c) ~~(S)~~
- (d) ~~(S)~~
- (e) ~~(S)~~
- (f) ~~(TS)~~
- (g) ~~(FS)~~
- (h) ~~(FS)~~
- (i) ~~(S)~~

*9 ASSUMPTIONS*

*(b)(1)*

b. (U) Weapons Allocation


(1) ~~(FS)~~

(2) ~~(TS)~~

*(b)(1)*

*(b)(1)*





1. ~~(TS)~~
2. ~~(TS)~~
3. ~~(TS)~~
4. ~~(TS)~~
5. (TS)

(b)(1)

(d) (U) In addition to the priorities listed above, allocate SIOP weapons as follows:

1. ~~(TS)~~
2. ~~(TS)~~
3. ~~(TS)~~
4. ~~(TS)~~
5. ~~(TS)~~
6. ~~(TS)~~

(b)(1)

c. (U) Defense Suppression Planning

(1) ~~(S)~~

(2) ~~(S)~~

(3) ~~(S)~~

(4) ~~(S)~~

d. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

e. (U) Measures of Effectiveness

(1) (U) Damage Expectancy

(a) ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

(b) (e) [ ]  
 (c) (e) [ ]  
 (d) (S) [ ]  
 (2) (S) [ ]  
 (3) (e) [ ]

[ ] (b) (1)  
 [ ] (b) (1)  
 [ ] (b) (1)  
 [ ] (b) (1)  
 [ ] (b) (1)

(4) (U) USSTRATCOM, DIA, and DNA should continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness methodologies that support SIOP option planning.

10. (S) [ LIMITED ATTACK OPTIONS (p. vii) ]

[ ] (b) (1)

a. (S) [ ]

[ ] (b) (1)

- b. (S)
- (1) (S)
- (2) (S)
- (3) (S)
- (4) (S)
- (5) (S)
- (6) (S)
- (7) (S)
- (a) (S)
- (b) (S)

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- c. ~~(FS)~~ [
- (1) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (2) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (3) ~~(FS)~~ [
- d. ~~(FS)~~ [
- e. ~~(FS)~~ [
- (1) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (2) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (3) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (a) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (b) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (c) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (4) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (5) ~~(FS)~~ [
- (6) ~~(FS)~~ [

- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)
- ] (b)(1)

(7) (FS)

(8) (FS)

(9) (S)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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12 February 1996

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D-24

Enclosure D

~~TOP SECRET~~



PART II. NRF AND ADAPTIVE PLANNING (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ PURPOSE (P. VII)

a.

b. ~~(TS)~~

2. ~~(TS)~~ SRF STRUCTURE (P. VII)

a. ~~(TS)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

(1) ~~(S)~~

(2) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)


(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(2) (S) [ (b) (1) ]



(UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure D-3. (U) Nuclear Reserve Force

3. (U) SRF Planning and Sizing.

a. (FS)

(1) (FS)

(a) (FS)

(b) (FS)

(c) (FS)

[ (b) (1) ]  
[ (b) (1) ]  
] (b) (1)  
] (b) (1)  
] (b) (1)

- (2) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (a) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (b) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (c) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (3) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (4) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (5) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- b. ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (1) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (2) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]
- (3) ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]

- (4) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (5) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (6) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)

4. (U) Adaptive Planning. Adaptive planning will be a principal means of Reserve force employment. It can occur in the pre-, trans-, or post-MAO timeframe and involve either SIOP/NSNF or Reserve forces.

- a. ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (1) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (2) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (3) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (4) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- b. ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (1) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)
- (2) ~~(FS)~~ [ (b)(1)

(3) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(4) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

c. (U) Employment Guidelines

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(2) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(a) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(b) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(3) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

d. ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(1) ~~(TS)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(2) (S)



(b)(1)

ENCLOSURE E  
THEATER NUCLEAR PLANNING (U)

1. (S) [ Scope and Applicability (p. viii) ]

(b)(1)

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2. (U) General

a. (S) [ ]

(b)(1)

b. (S) [ ]

(b)(1)

c. (S) [ ]

(b)(1)

(1) (U) Assist combatant CINCs in developing the appropriate appendix to their operation plans.

(2) (S) [ ]

(b)(1)

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Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: X-4

- (3) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (4) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (5) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (6) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (7) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- d. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- e. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (1) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (2) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (3) (U) Act as manager for USCINCEUR SAS and PAL systems.
- (4) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

3. (U) Theater Targeting Requirements

a. (U) Appropriate combatant CINCs will:



- (1) (S) [
- (2) (S) [
- (3) (S) [
- (4) (S) [
- (5) (S) [

] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)

b. (U) USSTRATCOM will:

- (1) (S) [
- (2) (S) [
- (3) (S) [
- (4) (S) [
- (5) (S) [

] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)  
 ] (b)(1)

4. (U) Theater Nuclear Targeting Limitations. Limitations and constraints for theater nuclear targeting are in Enclosure C, paragraph 8.

5. (U) Theater Nuclear Option Employment

a. (U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be approval authority for all weapon system and command and control aircraft requests by the supported CINC.

- b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

[

]

(b) (1)

c. (S)

[

]

(b) (1)

d. (S)

[

]

(b) (1)

(1) (S)

[

]

(b) (1)

(2) (S)

[

]

(b) (1)

(3) (U) USSTRATCOM will coordinate the planning and generation of appropriate nuclear forces with other supporting CINCs. ✓

e. (S)

[

]

(b) (1)

(1) (U) Explicit objectives.

(2) (U) Type of facility, and relation, if any, to enemy power projection capability.

(3) (U) Probability of success.

(4) (U) Alternative means to achieve the objective, if any.

(5) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(6) (U) Estimated fatalities (prompt and fallout).

(7) (U) Size of the attack.

(8) (U) Type of delivery system.

] (b) (1)

(9) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(10) (S) [

(11) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(12) (U) Probable perception of US will and resolve.

(13) (U) Likelihood and acceptability of probable enemy response on the US or its allies.

(14) (S) [

] (b) (1)

(15) (U) Adequacy of attack as a demonstration of US capability.

(16) (U) Relationship to other US military presence.

(17) (U) Relationship to US vital interests, treaty commitments, diplomatic agreements, and denial and escalation implications.

(18) (S) [

] (b) (1)

f. (S) [

] (b) (1)

g. (S) [

] (b) (1)

h. (S) [

] (b) (1)

i. (S) [

] (b) (1)

6. (U) Nuclear Appendices to OPLANs

a. (U) When required, nuclear appendices to OPLANs will be developed in the format and contain the information required by JOPEs Volumes I and II. Additionally, these appendices will include the following:

- (1) (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- (2) (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- (3) (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- (4) (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- (5) (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- (6) (S) [ ] (b)(1)

b. (U) Combatant CINCs will submit appendices to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval during plan review and to USSTRATCOM for information.

7. (U) Crisis Management. Combatant CINCs and USCINCSTRAT will maintain the capability to plan and execute theater nuclear options for generated nuclear forces on short notice during crisis and emergency situations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCSTRAT, and CINCs having nuclear requirements will develop crisis management and nuclear employment planning tools and procedures to ensure responsive option development and interaction among NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant CINCs, and appropriate intelligence agencies.

8. (U) Adaptive Planning Procedure

- a. (S) [ ] (b)(1)

- b. (S)
- c. (S)
- d. (S)
- e. (S)
- f. (S)
- g. (S)

- (b) (1)
- (b) (1)
- (b) (1)
- (b) (1)
- (b) (1)
- (b) (1)

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E-8

Enclosure E

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ENCLOSURE F

RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(U)

1. (S) PURPOSE + SCOPE (P. VII)

(b)(1)

2. (S) RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVES (P. VIII)

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(b)(1)

3. (S) Applicability (P. VIII)

(b)(1)

a. (S)

(b)(1)

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: X-4

- b. (S) [redacted] (b)(1)
- c. (S) [redacted] (b)(1)
- d. (S) [redacted] (b)(1)
- 4. (S) RECONNAISSANCE PRIORITIES (P. VII) [redacted] (b)(1)

a. (U) General Priorities. The intelligence collection requirement categories are prioritized as follows:

- (1) (S) [redacted]
- (2) (S) [redacted]
- (3) (S) [redacted]

- [redacted] (b)(1)
- [redacted] (b)(1)
- [redacted] (b)(1)





- b. (S) [
- (1) (S) [
- (2) (S) [

(b)(1)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(1)

6. (U) Planning Concepts.

a. (S) [

(b)(1)

b. (S) [

(b)(1)

7. (U) Planning Guidelines/Requirements

a. ~~(S)~~



(b)(1)

b. ~~(S)~~



(b)(1)


c. ~~(S)~~



(b)(1)


d. (U) Preplanning

(1) ~~(S)~~



(b)(1)

(2) ~~(S)~~



(a) (U) Assume SIOP forces are fully generated.

(b) (S)

(c) (S)

(d) (S)

(e) (S)

(b)(1)

(f) (U) Coordinate reconnaissance missions requiring defense suppression with the Joint Staff.

(g) (S)

(b)(1)

(3) (S)

(b)(1)

e. (S)

(b)(1)

f. (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(1) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(2) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

g. (U) Reporting

(1) (U) All reconnaissance plans supporting nuclear options will include specific reference to the procedures for reporting reconnaissance information, including advisory support and any significant events or encounters.

(2) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(3) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(4) (S) [ (b)(1) ]

h. (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(1) (S) [

] (b)(1)

(2) (S) [

] (b)(1)

8. (U) Battle Management Considerations.

a. (S) [

] (b)(1)

(1) (S) [

] (b)(1)

(2) (S) [

] (b)(1)

b. (S) [

] (b)(1)

ENCLOSURE G

SIOP AND NRF REVIEW, APPROVAL, AND ANALYSIS (U)

1. (U) Scope and Applicability. This section contains procedures for maintaining the SIOP and NRF; reviewing option development; approving revisions; and analyzing various aspects of the SIOP and NRF.

2. (S) [ GENERAL (p. viii) ] (b)(1)

3. (U) SIOP and NRF Revision. Any revision to the SIOP or NRF will be categorized as a new plan and uniquely identified by attaching the last two digits of the calendar year (e.g., SIOP-96 represents a new plan implemented during calendar year 1996). If more than one new plan is required during a calendar-year, it will be identified by sequentially attaching a letter to the year(e.g., SIOP-96A).

a. (U) Plan Revision.

(1) (S) [ 98-53h  
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(2) (S) [ ] (b)(1)

b. (S) [ ] (b)(1)

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Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: X-4

4. ~~(S)~~ [

a. ~~(S)~~ [

[

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

[

(2) (U) SIOP and NRF Revision Report

(a) ~~(C)~~ [

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

] (b)(1)

FOIA

] (b)(1)



[

]

(b)(1)

1. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

2. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

3. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

4. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

a. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

b. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

c. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

5. (S) [

]

(b)(1)

6. (U) Other topics as desired or requested.

(b) (U) Use the following assumptions in preparing the Revision Report:

- 1. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- 2. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (c) (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- 1. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- 2. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- 3. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- 4. (S) [ (b)(1) ]

b. (U) Other Briefing/Reporting Requirements. USSTRATCOM will provide applicable briefings and/or reports to those supported or supporting CINCs et al as requested or when changes of command occur.

5. (U) SIOP Analysis The SIOP will be analyzed in three phases.

a. (U) Phase I: Consequences of Execution Analysis. USSTRATCOM will accomplish a monthly consequences of execution analysis to help assess SIOP effectiveness. In addition, USSTRATCOM will conduct similar analysis before submitting a new plan or major plan revision for approval. The analysis will be performed and reported for each MAO and LAO based on the employment of SIOP-committed weapons. SIOP planning factors will be used for all planning assumptions. This analysis will be presented as part of the Revision Report.

b. (U) Phase II: War Game Analysis. USSTRATCOM will conduct a war game analysis on an annual basis, or as soon as possible after a revision, to assess the SIOP's capability to comply with current guidance. Such

analysis will include the potential contribution of SACEUR's MCOs and encompass various scenarios to include prolonged exchange. Because of the uncertainties in installation configuration, population distribution, compound nuclear effects, and other considerations, the values resulting from such analyses should be presented as relative measures of the probable results rather than as absolute or exact predictions. To support war game activities and feedback:

- (1) (U) USSTRATCOM will brief war game results to the Joint Staff and others as requested.
  - (2) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8 will exchange (in accordance with Joint Staff directives) RISOP and SIOP products and other such planning information as needed.
  - (3) (U) J-8 will analyze and validate the war game data and perform other analyses as required.
  - (4) (U) J-3 (with J-5 and J-8 coordination) will provide USSTRATCOM with baseline wargaming planning timelines.
  - (5) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8, based on their war game analysis, will make recommendations for improving guidance, data bases, planning factors, guidelines to C3 operations, SIOP and MCO coordination, etc.
  - (6) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8 will solicit recommendations for special wargaming topics.
- c. (U) Phase III: Intelligence Assessment Analysis. DIA will conduct intelligence assessment analysis at the request of the Director, Joint Staff, using SIOP data provided by USSTRATCOM.

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G-6

Enclosure G

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ENCLOSURE H  
RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

- 1. (U) Purpose. This section assigns responsibilities for various tasks.
- 2. (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will:
  - a. (U) In coordination with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) (S)

(2) (S)

(3)

(4) (S)

b. (S)

c. (S)

d. (S)

e. (S)

f. (S)

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(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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Reason: 1.5(a)

Declassify on: X-4

H-1

Enclosure H

- g. (U) Review and approve nuclear weapon employment plans (including the SIOP), associated target lists, and supporting reconnaissance planning.
- h. (U) Review and approve prelaunch survivability factors, as well as weapon system reliability and accuracy factors.
- i. (U) Establish and maintain the necessary procedures for the preparation of plans called for by this guidance.
- j. (U) Establish and maintain EAPs in support of this guidance. Review EAPs evolving from EAP-CJCS directives.
- k. (U) Establish and maintain procedures necessary to provide for a high degree of interaction with the NCA during the course of a crisis, to include providing appropriate information concerning available options and predicted outcomes; the status of US forces; the intelligence obtained from US and allied reconnaissance missions; and the results of US, allied, and enemy nuclear strikes.
- l. (U) Review the results of SIOP war games conducted by USSTRATCOM.
- m. (U) Ensure coordination of national and command plans for reconnaissance and intelligence support of nuclear operations. Identify supporting commands to fulfill reconnaissance requirements determined during theater nuclear plan review or identified by the affected combatant CINC to be beyond the capability of command assets.
- n. (U) Advise the President and the Secretary of Defense, as required, of actions taken to carry out the policy guidance in this supplement.
- o. (U) Provide to the Secretary of Defense periodic evaluations of the risk, limitations, and effectiveness of nuclear weapon employment plans and supporting reconnaissance planning.
- p. (U) Submit requests for exceptions to established policy, as required, to the Secretary of Defense. In this regard, whenever military objectives are constrained and military effectiveness is degraded, identify the problem to the Secretary of Defense and prepare appropriate solutions.
- q. (U) Perform operational oversight of NPES management. Conduct independent validation and verification of NPES and derivative software.

r. (S) [ ] (b) (1)

3. COMBATANT CINC'S (P-VIII)

a. (S) [ ] (b) (1)

- [ (b) (1) ]
- b. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- c. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- d. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- e. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- f. (U) Submit appropriate data for committed reconnaissance assets in the form of source data inputs to USSTRATCOM for inclusion in nuclear reconnaissance documentation.
- g. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- h. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- i. (S) [ (b) (1) ]
- j. (U) Maintain capability or methodology to adaptively plan TNOs and DPOs, as required, to meet contingencies.
- k. (S) [ (b) (1) ]

- [ ] (b)(1)
- l. (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- m. (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- n. (U) Develop intelligence collection requirements for TNOs.
- o. (S) [ ] (b)(1)
- p. (U) Develop reconnaissance appendixes to support command-developed nuclear appendixes to OPLANs and CONPLANs.
- q. (U) If directed, provide reconnaissance support for theater nuclear plans approved for execution within their AOR but developed by another CINC.
- r. (U) Advise other commands of support requirements for operations in their AOR.
- s. (U) Review intelligence agency plans that support combatant command nuclear operation plans.
- t. (U) Provide appropriate information to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the status of forces to execute options developed in accordance with guidance herein.
- u. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.
- 4. (U) USCINCSTRAT. In addition to the applicable responsibilities listed in paragraph 3 above, USCINCSTRAT will:
  - a. (U) Develop, maintain, and publish the SIOP, preplanned SRF options, and, in coordination with the appropriate CINCs, applicable target lists.



- b. (U) Coordinate nuclear employment activities, to the maximum extent practicable, with combatant CINCs and specified allied commanders.
- c. (U) Analyze, assess, and provide to the appropriate CINCs the impact of theater nuclear options upon the SIOP and the extent to which they impact on SIOP objectives.
- d. (U) Develop, maintain and publish guidelines and procedures for collection, evaluation, and reporting of planning factors used in SIOP development (i.e., PLS, reliability, and accuracy factors).
- e. (U) Receive service inputs for SIOP planning factors and validate methodology and rationale for their development.
- f. (U) Present SIOP planning factors along with supporting methodology and rationale for their development to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- g. (U) In coordination with affected CINCs and the Director, DIA, as appropriate, develop and provide programs for assessing the penetration capabilities of strategic weapon systems.

h. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

i. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

j. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

k. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

l. ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(1) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

(2) ~~(S)~~ [

] (b)(1)

- (3) (S) [redacted] (b) (1)
- (4) (S) [redacted] (b) (1)
- (5) (S) [redacted] (b) (1)
- (6) (S) [redacted]
- m. (S) [redacted] (b) (1)
- n. (S) [redacted]
- o. (S) [redacted]
- p. (S) [redacted]
- q. (S) [redacted]
- r. (U) In coordination with DIA and DNA, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness methodologies that support SIOP option planning.
- s. (S) [redacted] (b) (1)
- t. (U) Conduct analysis of strike assessment coverage for the SIOP and preplanned TNOs, recommend modifications that will enhance reconnaissance coverage, and provide supporting data and documentation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands, as appropriate.

u. (C) [ (b)(1) ]

v. (U) With DIA, co-chair the PCC to identify and prioritize strategic nuclear targeting intelligence requirements and to coordinate and produce an annual intelligence production plan to satisfy these requirements, consistent with available resources.

w. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

x. (U) Perform nuclear reconnaissance planning in support of the CINCs, including routing, tasking, and timing in support of nuclear weapon strike assessment.

y. (U) Maintain the capability to analyze and assess the probability of success of strike or reconnaissance sorties supporting nuclear options and provide each command the result of the analyses.

z. (U) Recommend changes to nuclear reconnaissance guidance to improve reconnaissance coverage.

aa. (U) Develop, maintain, and publish the NUWEP Reconnaissance List and other documentation related to strike assessment planning necessary to determine the results of US and allied nuclear strikes in support of the SIOP and preplanned TNOs.

bb. (U) Provide USSTRATCOM Decision Papers to the Joint Staff.

cc. (S) [ (b)(1) ]

dd. (U) Develop and present a concept briefing to Joint Staff, OSD, Service representatives, and other interested agencies after completion of the allocation phase of SIOP and NRF option development.

ee. (C) [ (b)(1) ]

ff. (U) Prepare the SIOP (Basic), including annexes and appendixes, and submit it as soon as possible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

gg. (U) Accomplish a consequences of execution analysis for each MAO and LAO. Present the resulting analysis as part of the Revision Report.

hh. (U) Conduct war game analysis to assess the SIOP's capability to comply with current guidance. Brief results of the analysis to the Joint Staff at the earliest opportunity following the SIOP revision effective date and others as requested.

ii. (U) Provide the NTB, strike files, evacuated data base, supporting documentation, and war games output for use in Joint Staff SIOP analysis.

jj. (U) Provide Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP and TNO data tapes in accordance with the NEREP.

kk. (S) [ ] (b) (1)

ll. (C) [ ] (b) (1)

mm. (U) During the effective period of a major SIOP revision, advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any significant decrease in reported damage expectancies.

nn. (U) Perform as functional, program, and technical manager of NPES. Exercise supervision of DISA technical programs in support of NPES.

oo. (U) As the C<sup>3</sup> Systems Engineer for NPES and successor NC<sup>2</sup>AIS, develop and maintain software associated with NPES and successor NC<sup>2</sup>AIS for theater nuclear plan development, maintenance, dissemination, and DPO planning in a crisis environment. As the designated developing agency for NPES, USSTRATCOM will ensure that these programs are supported. USSTRATCOM will provide designated users with these software packages and training materials as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

pp. (U) Maintain copies of the TDI produced by DIA, and of applicable target lists produced by USSTRATCOM, for distribution to the combatant CINCs. Comparable BLUE data will be collected, maintained, produced, and distributed on request to authorized users.

qq. (U) Forward monthly maintenance action reports to the Joint Staff.  
(J-38)

5. (S) SUPPORTING CINC'S (p. viii)

a.

(b)(1)

b. (S)

(b)(1)

(1) (U) In coordination with the Joint Staff and ACE, develop, publish and maintain EAPs applicable to all EUCOM theater nuclear delivery platforms and command and control systems.

(2) (S)

(b)(1)

(3) (U) Act as manager for USCINCEUR SAS and PAL systems.

(4) (S)

(b)(1)

6. (U) Director, DIA. DIA will:

a. (S)

(b)(1)

b. (S)

(b)(1)

c. (U) With USSTRATCOM, co-chair the PCC to identify and prioritize strategic nuclear targeting intelligence requirements and to coordinate and produce an annual intelligence production plan to satisfy these requirements, consistent with available resources.

d. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

e. (U) Establish goals for the enhancement of the data base to meet the dictates of the SSP and document the programs for achieving those goals.

f. (U) Effect necessary technical and substantive changes to the target intelligence programs and target materials. Coordinate such changes, through established SSP and MTIMS procedures, with commands and organizations charged with planning or conducting nuclear combat operations and with other organizations as appropriate. Ensure that the process for effecting target intelligence changes is responsive to the dictates of national policy and is documented in appropriate publications. Target intelligence and target materials issues impacting on the nuclear planning process will be staffed through established SSP and MTIC procedures. Those issues that remain unresolved will be presented to the Director, DIA, for final determination. Further recourse on unresolved issues can be made through Joint Staff channels.

g. ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]

h. (U) Provide staff intelligence support for rapid development, assessment, and execution of TNOs.

i. (U) Review intelligence annexes and supporting target and reconnaissance lists of operation plans prepared by the combatant commands.

j. (U) Provide staff intelligence support for employment planning of the NRF following acquisition of poststrike information.

k. (U) In collaboration with the appropriate commands, develop, publish, and maintain the NNICP, which includes NCA EEIs.

l. ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]

m. ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]

n. ~~(S)~~ [ (b)(1) ]

o. (U) In coordination with USSTRATCOM and DNA, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness that support SIOP option planning.

p. (U) Annually update the Red Strategic Target Data Base(RSTDB) and provide weapon characteristics and targeting strategies.

7. (U) Director, NSA. NSA will:

a. ~~(C)~~

b. ~~(S)~~

c. ~~(S)~~

d. ~~(C)~~

e. ~~(S)~~

f. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

g. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

8. (U) Director, DISA. DISA will:

a. (U) As the Nuclear C<sup>3</sup> Systems Engineer, provide technical advice, assistance, and analysis to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, CINCs, and Defense agencies on matters pertaining to nuclear C<sup>3</sup> planning, assessment (including communication system reliability planning factors), system engineering, test and evaluation, and other support for nuclear decision-making and execution of war plans (including termination) throughout the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict.

b. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

c. (U) Provide population data as follows:

(1) (U) Population data on cities in countries not included in the SIOP or in SRF options with populations exceeding 25,000.

(2) (U) Rural cell data on populated areas in countries not included in the SIOP or in SRF options.

(3) (S) [redacted] (b)(1)

NOTE: (U) The data base for these countries will be improved and maintained as accurately as resources permit.

d. (U) In conjunction with DIA, provide counter C<sup>3</sup> warhead and HAB allocation and electronic warfare threat prediction to the Director, J-8, for use in RISOP development.

9. (U) Director, DMA. DMA will:

a. (S) [redacted] (b)(1)

b. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

10. (U) Director, DNA. DNA will provide advice and assistance, as required, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, CINCs, and Defense agencies on the following matters concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons employment planning:

- a. (U) Nuclear weapon effects on weapon systems and forces.
- b. (U) Analysis, as required, of nuclear weapons planning and employment options.
- c. (U) Technical analysis, studies, research, and development of software to improve the application, employment, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons and weapon systems.
- d. (U) Nuclear weapon survivability and security.
- e. (U) Emergency support to DOD components and other Federal agencies in response to a nuclear accident.
- f. (U) Radiological defense activities.
- g. (U) The effects of technology on nuclear force structure, operations, and politico-military constraints.



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- h. (U) Provide nuclear effects models and data, hardening technology, test support, and system survivability assessments for use by the Nuclear C<sup>3</sup> Systems Engineer.
- i. (U) In coordination with USSTRATCOM, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness that support SIOP option planning.
- j. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

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Enclosure H

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ENCLOSURE I

GLOSSARY\*(U)

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS (U)

AA	attack assessment
ABM	antiballistic missile
ACE	Allied Command Europe
A-Hour	Alert-Hour
ALD	accounting line designator
ANPP	ACE Nuclear Planning Process
AOR	area of responsibility
ASAT	antisatellite
ASF	ACE Strike File
ASRP	Airborne SIOP Reconnaissance Plan
BE	Basic Encyclopedia
C <sup>2</sup>	command and control
C <sup>3</sup>	command, control, and communications
C <sup>3</sup> I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C <sup>4</sup> I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CCG	Crisis Coordination Group
CCP	Contingency Collection Plan
CDE	compound damage expectancy
CEP	circular error probable
CINCS	commanders of unified commands
CLSF	Composite Launch Sequence File
CMAH	CINC Mobile Alternate Headquarters
CMSA	cruise missile support activities
CNI	communication of NATO intent
COER	contingency operational ELINT requirement
COMINT	communications intelligence
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
COSAND	Consolidated SIOP Analysis Document
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities List
CTF	Commander Task Force
DCA	dual-capable aircraft
DE	damage expectancy

Obtained Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by Hans M. Kristensen  
98-53h

\* Abbreviations in Part I are UNCLASSIFIED; Part II contains classified information.

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: X-4

DEFCON	defense readiness condition
DGZ	desired ground zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAM	Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DPO	Directed Planning Option
DR	delayed response
DTD	day-to-day
DUG Attack	Deep Underground Attack
EAP-CJCS	Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
EI	essential elements of information
ELINT	electronic intelligence
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
ERT	execution reference time
ESI	extremely sensitive information
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCI	ground controlled intercept
GEN	generated
GIPS	Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications
GRU	Russian Military Intelligence
HAB	high-altitude bursts
HOB	height of burst
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human-resource intelligence
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IDB	Integrated Data Base
IR	intermediate range
J-3	Operations Directorate, Joint Staff
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, Joint Staff
J-8	Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Joint Staff
JCC	Joint Coordination Center
JOPEX	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
KGB	Committee for State Security (Russian)

LAO	Limited Attack Option
LCF	launch control facility
LF	launch facility
LR	long range
LRA	long-range aviation
MAO	Major Attack Option
MCO	Major Contingency Option
MD	Military District (Russian)
MIIDS	Military Intelligence Integrated Data System
MNC	Major NATO Commander
MNR	Major Nuclear Response
MOB	main operating base
MOC	Ministry of Communication
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MRC	major regional contingency
MTIMS	Military Target Intelligence Management Structure
MVD	Ministry for Internal Affairs (Russian)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAOC	National Airborne Operations Center
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCCP	Nuclear Command Control Procedures
NDL	National DGZ List
NEREP	Nuclear Execution Reporting Plan
NIS	Newly Independent States
NISP	Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Support Plan
NM	nautical mile
NNICP	National Nuclear Intelligence Collection Plan
NOG	Nuclear Operations Group
NPES	Nuclear Planning and Execution System
NPS	Nuclear Planning System
NRF	Nuclear Reserve Force
NRL	NUWEP Reconnaissance List
NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NSC	National Security Council
NSNF	nonstrategic nuclear forces
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
NTB	National Target Base
NUWEP	Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P-95	population circles
PA	probability of arrival
PAR	population at risk
PCC	SSP Coordinating Committee
PD	probability of damage

PLC	Positive Launch Control
PLS	prelaunch survivability
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRL	prompt retaliatory launch
PTP	probability to penetrate
RB	reentry body
RFTL	Reserve Force Target List
RISNO	Reconnaissance In Support of Nuclear Operations
RISOP	Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan
RRF	reconnaissance reserve force
RV	reentry vehicle
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SCO	Selective Contingency Option
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SNU	Selective Nuclear Use
SRF	Secure Reserve Force
SRT	strategic relocatable target
SSBN	fleet ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-powered
SSGN	cruise missile attack submarine, nuclear powered
SSN	attack submarine, nuclear powered
SSP	SIOP Support Plan
STAVKA	executive organ of the VGK
STRATLAT	USSTRATCOM Liaison Assistance Team
TDD	target DGZ designator
TDI	Target Data Inventory
TI	Target Island
TIPP	Target Intelligence Production Plan
TLAM/N	TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile-Nuclear
TNO	theater nuclear option
TNPD	Theater Nuclear Planning Document
TVD	Theater of Military Operation (Russian)
TW/AA	tactical warning/attack assessment
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, US European Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
USCINCSTRAT	Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
USSTRATCOM	US Strategic Command
UTC	Urgent Targeting Change

VGK	Supreme High Command (CIS)
VNTK	vulnerability number
WAC	World Area Code
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSI	war supporting industries
WSR	weapon system reliability
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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GL-6


Glossary

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GLOSSARY (U)

PART II--definitions \* (U)



\* Definitions are applicable only in the context of this document. Definitions in this section either do not appear in Joint Pub 1-02 or were expanded for specific application to the Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP. A further compilation of CJCS-approved definitions pertaining to the SIOP is included in the SIOP (Basic).

- b. (S) [ ] (b) (1)
- c. (S) [ ] (b) (1)
- d. (S) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Allocated (nuclear). The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of war plans. (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the war plans. Expenditures of these weapons are not authorized until released by proper authority.) Joint Pub 1-02. ✓


- (S) [ ] (b) (1)
- (S) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Collateral Damage. Damage inflicted on installations not targeted in the executed option or not objective to the DGZ being evaluated for damage.

(U) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An association comprising the former Soviet Republics (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) that has taken over many functions formerly exercised under Soviet national-level political and military control (i.e., Soviet NCA, MOD, and General Staff). The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not members of the CIS.

(U) Consequences of Execution (C of E). An evaluation which examines attack options and planning assumptions against a range of most representative values of approved planning factors and technical parameters (e.g., pre-launch survivability, weapon system reliability, weapon yield, and VNTKs) and that estimates damage expectancies and expected fatalities for all preplanned SIOP attack options.

(U) Constraint. A targeting limitation in which certain target categories are prohibited from attack for reasons of National policy.



(U) Cross-Targeting. The layering of weapons from different delivery platforms to increase the probability of weapon arrival and the confidence in damaging the target to the specified level. ✓

(U) Damage Expectancy (DE). The probability that a weapon will arrive, detonate, and achieve at least a specified level of damage (severe or moderate) against a given target. DE is a function of both probability of arrival (PA) and probability of damage (PD) of a weapon. ✓

(S) [ ] (b) (1)

(TS) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Desired Ground Zero (DGZ). A point on the earth's surface below, at, or above which the detonation of a nuclear weapon is planned. DGZ may be expressed in either geographic or geodetic coordinates. ✓

(TS) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Disablement. The act of rendering a nuclear weapon incapable of achieving a nuclear yield by destroying critical components so that factory rebuild or depot-level repair is required to permit the weapon to function in its intended mode. ✓

(S) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Dispersal Site. An area or installation used by forces during periods of alert, mobilization, or armed conflict to reduce vulnerability to detection and/or attack.

(U) Dose Index. The total expected dose for the unprotected population at a selected monitor point, adjusted for wind and radiation correlation among target areas.

(U) Effective Protection Factor. A value assigned to the fallout protection realized by a population through the use of available shelters. It is a function of shelter radiation transmission factors, distribution of population among the shelters, and time spent inside them.

(S) [ ] (b) (1)

(U) Energy Network. That segment of a nation's industrial base (including production and distribution) that provides energy in the form of electricity, petroleum, and natural gas required to support the rest of the industrial-economic base, military operations, and the general population. ✓

(U) Escalation Control. The concept of limiting the level, scope, duration or intensity of a conflict with the objective of terminating the crisis/war at the lowest level of conflict possible and on terms favorable to the United States. ✓

(S) [ ] (b)(1)

(U) Expected Dose. The predicted unprotected radiation dose at a selected monitor point resulting from a specified nuclear detonation. ✓

(C) [ ] (b)(1)

(U) Fatalities. Deaths produced by the short-term effects of nuclear detonations. ✓

(S) [ ] (b)(1)

(U) Generated (GEN). A force readiness condition which assumes the generation of all missiles, SSBNs and aircraft to alert status. ✓

(U) Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications (GIPS). Comprehensive documentation of all production specifications for the various programs in the MIIDS IDB, including the TDI and the CPFL.

(U) High-Altitude Bursts (HAB). The explosion of a nuclear weapon which takes place at a height in excess of 100,000 feet (30,000 meters), having the objective of disrupting electronic circuits through exposure to the disruptive effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Both objective and non-objective installations may be exposed to the generated EMP field because of the large area coverage associated with HABs. The release of HAB weapons will be determined solely by the objective of the attack option since there is no blast or debris damage associated with this tactic. ✓

(U) Integrated Data Base (IDB). The core automated data base of the MIIDS. It describes units, personnel, equipment, facilities, and installations in accordance with Joint Pub 1-02 definitions. The information in the IDB is integrated in a manner to facilitate analytical manipulation of information to assess the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of countries worldwide (except the United States and Canada). ✓

(c) [ (b) (1) ]

(U) Layering. The application of two or more weapons to a single target to improve the confidence that a weapon will arrive and/or the desired damage level will be achieved. ✓

(FS) [ (b) (1) ]

(FS) [ (b) (1) ]

(U) Maximum Allowable Dose Index. The maximum allowed unprotected dose, at any selected monitor point, for a defined set of population risk criteria (risk level, risk dose, and population exposure level). ✓

(c) [ (b) (1) ]  
(S) [ (b) (1) ]

a. (S) [ (b) (1) ]

b. (S) [ (b) (1) ]

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c. (S)

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(U) Monitor Point. A selected geographic point for which the expected dose is evaluated. ✓

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(U) National Command Authorities. Consist only of The President and the Secretary of Defense, their successors or duly deputized alternate. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the

commanders of the unified commands. The channel of communication for execution of the SIOP and other time-sensitive operations is from the President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the executing commanders. ✓

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(U) National-Level Military Controls. The command elements, associated staffs, command post facilities, and supporting communications (in the hierarchically structured military C<sup>3</sup> systems) responsible for preparing and maintaining a military force structure for war, as well as planning and executing combat operations with that force.

(U) National-Level Political Controls. Under the direction of the Russian NCA, national-level political controls are organizations located primarily in the region of the capital in peacetime administrative headquarters and wartime facilities. Part of the national-level wartime management system, national-level political controls consist of decision making organizations and personnel responsible for planning and managing political organs, military forces, and economic resources that sustain the affairs of government and the nation in peace or war. These organizations include the President, Security Council, Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), selected state committees and commissions, and the communications and other facilities that support national-level fixed and mobile command posts.

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(U) Newly Independent States (NIS). A term describing the former Soviet Union Republics.

(c)

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(U) Non-strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF). Those nuclear-capable forces located in an area of military operations with a capability to employ nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed, when authorized by competent authority, to support operations that contribute to the accomplishment of the commander's mission within the theater of operations. The categorizations of NSNFs include: (1) Dual-capable aircraft--Land-based nuclear-capable aircraft with less than intercontinental combat range; and (2) TLAM/N--Sea-based nuclear system with less than intercontinental range that is used to strike targets ashore.

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(U) P-95 Circle. A circle encompassing 95 percent of the nighttime population of a city or urban area. Specific criteria, including maximal and minimal limits for the size of the P-95 circle and the minimal population to be included in the circle, are prescribed in DIA's Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specification (GIPS) documents. For computational purposes, the distribution of the population within the circle is assumed to be circular normal. Used in Consequences of Execution (C of E) analysis.

- (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(U) Pre-launch Survivability. The probability that a delivery vehicle will survive an enemy attack and be available for execution. The following factors are used in association with PLS:

- a. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- b. (S) [ (b)(1) ]
- (S) [ (b)(1) ]

(U) Probability of Arrival (PA). The probability that the weapon will successfully arrive and detonate in the target area as planned. PA is typically broken down into components, including PLS, WSR, and PTP.

(U) Probability of Damage (PD). The probability that an arriving weapon with a given yield, circular error probable (CEP), height of burst (HOB), and displacement from a target or set of targets will achieve at least the specified degree of damage to the target. The target is characterized by type, size, and vulnerability to weapon effects.

(U) Prompt Nuclear Effects. Blast, thermal effects, and initial nuclear radiation resulting from a nuclear detonation that causes personnel casualties and fatalities and material damage. Thermal and radiation effects, though present, are not yet considered in assessing material damage. All three effects (blast, thermal, and radiation) are used to calculate population at risk (PAR) and personnel casualties.

- (S) [ (b)(1) ]

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](b)(1)

(FOUO) "In order to increase the uncertainties in the minds of Russian planners, it is not our policy to explain in detail how we would respond to a Russian missile attack. However, the United States does not rely on its capability for launch on warning or launch under attack to ensure the credibility of its deterrent. At the same time, the US ability to carry out such options complicates Russian assessments of war outcomes and enhances deterrence."

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(U) Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP). A Joint Staff-approved hypothetical Russian strategic war plan whose primary purpose is to provide an evaluation tool for testing SIOP effectiveness through computer simulation.

(U) Release. Presidential authorization to use nuclear weapons.

(S)

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](b)(1)

(S) [	]
	(b)(1)

(U) Risk Dose. The radiation dose deemed acceptable by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) Rural Cell Data. Population estimates for areas geographically divided into rectangles circumscribed by a specified number of minutes of longitude and latitude. For computational purposes, the distribution of the population within these cells is assumed to be uniform.

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(S) [	]	(b)(1)
(S) [	]	(b)(1)
(S) [	]	(b)(1)
(S) [	]	(b)(1)
(TS) [	]	(b)(1)

(U) SIOP Support Program (SSP). Program responsible for unifying and enhancing a wide variety of DOD intelligence support activities associated with

US strategic nuclear targeting, and for consolidating and prioritizing intelligence support requirements to the SIOP. The SSP Coordinating Committee, composed of representatives from DIA, the Joint Staff, OSD, and USSTRATCOM, serves as the focal point for program activities.

(U) SSP Production Plan. The annual intelligence support requirements statement which documents, in priority order, all known SIOP-related support requirements. Plan provides a prioritized listing of intelligence support activities that can be supported by available resources and a prioritized listing of requirements that cannot be implemented in the production plan due to resource shortfalls. The Director, Joint Staff, in coordination with ASD(ISP) and ASD(C<sup>4</sup>I), will review and approve the plan.

FOIA 98-916  
9-14-98

(U) Strategic Nuclear Forces. Weapon systems (ICBM, SLBM, and aircraft) that possess intercontinental range (greater than 5,500 km) and are capable of striking one or more enemy targets to satisfy US nuclear employment objectives.

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(b)(1)

(U) Strategic Relocatable Target. A mobile or movable strategic nuclear weapon or function that does not have a static wartime location. Strategic relocatable targets may move while performing their intended function, or as doctrine and conditions dictate.

(U) Strategic Warning. Notification that enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent. This notification may be received any time prior to the initiation of hostilities.

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(b)(1)

(U) Supreme High Command. A select group of national-level military decision makers in Russia, including the Supreme Commander in Chief, Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Ministers of Defense, and Commanders in Chief of Russian Services. This NCA component is responsible for directing and managing the wartime military strategy and operations of Russian Armed Forces.

(U) Tactical Warning. Notification the enemy has initiated hostilities. Such warning may be received at any time, ranging from initial launch indications to weapon detonation.

(S) [ ] (b)(1)  
(e) [ ] (b)(1)

(U) Target Intelligence Production Plan (TIPP). An annually updated, long-term DIA research and production plan designed to identify, document, and solve critical intelligence gaps in US targeting strategy.

(U) Target Island. A geographic area encompassing one or more installations.

(U) Target Materials. Target intelligence presented in graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, microfilm, or other format suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations.

(S) [ ] (b)(1)  
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