


~~SECRET~~

# NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW



Obtained Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by Hans M. Kristensen

UNCLASSIFIED

UPDATE BRIEFING  
3 DEC 93

OPR: J513

~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~



**WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 5 (22 & 24 NOV)**

~~SECRET~~

DR WALLERSTEIN CHAIRED MTG

OBJECTIVES:

- REVIEW NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES, NO FIRST-USE, & NUCLEAR FREE ZONES
- DISCUSS NUC DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY MATRIX


CONTRIBUTORS:

**UNCLASSIFIED**

This document, as redacted, was released as part of USSTRATCOM FOIA Case # 97-66.

~~SECRET~~

USSTRATCOM



WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 5 (22 & 24 NOV)

~~SECRET~~

*Johnson*  
•  
CONTRIBUTORS (CONT):

- GROUP NOT SURE IF CHEM/BIO SHOULD BE CAPTURED UNDER NSAs/PSAs.
- MS JOHNSON: PROVIDED REVIEW OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONE ISSUES BEFORE THE USG
- WALLERSTEIN: HAS REMOVAL OF NUCs FROM KOREA/OFF NAVAL SHIPS IMPACTED PROLIFERATION?--GROUP, NO.
- *Johnson*  
•  
• ALTFIELD: FORWARD DEPLOYED WEAPONS PROVIDE TRIGGER MECHANISM; NON-DEPLOYED PRESENT TIME LINES PROBLEM IN PERCEPTION OF ADVERSARY.
- WOOLF: BLANKET STATEMENTS ON DETERRENCE/VALUE OF ARE NOT USEFUL--EACH COUNTRY/REGION IS DIFFERENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

USSTRATCOM



**WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 5 (22 & 24 NOV)**

~~SECRET~~

CONTRIBUTORS (CONT):

- WILSON (OSD/C3I): DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM JUST AN EXTENSION OF EXISTING POLICY ON RETALIATION.
- MR STEPHENS: TERRORISTS WILL NOT DRIVE FORCE POSTURE-- SUBSET OF LARGER PROBLEM.

b1, USSA  
✓


SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES:

- TERRORIST SCENARIO WAS MOST DIFFICULT TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT.
- "SMOKING GUN" EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE.

~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**STRATCOM**



**WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 6 (1 & 2 DEC)**

~~SECRET~~

DR WALLERSTEIN CHAIRED MTG

GUESTS: MR WILKENING & MR WATMAN, RAND

OBJECTIVES:

- REVIEW TWO RAND BRIEFINGS
  - REGIONAL ADVERSARIES IN REGIONAL CRISIS
  - RETHINKING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN REGIONAL CONFLICT
- COMPLETE CHEM/BIO DISCUSSION

CONTRIBUTORS:


- WATMAN: EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE MILITARY FACTOR.
  - ADDRESSED MOTIVATIONS TO OBTAIN NUCS, WHY US DETERRENCE IS CREDIBLE, CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO BE CREDIBLE.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**TRATCOM**

~~SECRET~~

This document was totally declassified and released as part of USSRATCOM FOIA Case # 97-66.



WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 6 (1 & 2 DEC)

~~SECRET~~

CONTRIBUTORS (CONT):

- WILKENING: NUCs SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM CHEM/BIO.
  - THIRD WORLD STATES OBTAIN NUCs TO:
    - » DETER US INTERVENTION
    - » INTIMIDATE US ALLIES
    - » LIMIT US WAR AIMS
  - REQUIRED MILITARY CAPABILITY PROBABLY NOT AFFORDABLE

~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

STRATCOM



WORKING GROUP 5  
WEEK 6 (1-2 DEC)

~~SECRET~~

CONTRIBUTORS (CONT):

- DISCUSSION ON DEEPLY BURIED FACILITIES

SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES:

- GROUP AGREED PROBABLY BAD IDEA TO EXPAND NSA TO INCLUDE CHEM/BIO & LEGALIZE UNDER NPT
- GROUP CONSENSUS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAIN THE ONLY METHOD OF DESTROYING CERTAIN TYPES OF TARGETS

WHAT'S NEXT:

- WILL MEET 8 DEC, 1300-1600
- EXPECT TO DETERMINE DRAFTING GROUPS & ASSIGNMENT

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

STRATCOM