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EUR PRESS GUIDANCE

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D E C L A S S I F I E D
DANISH PARLIAMENT'S SHIP VISIT RESOLUTION

Q: Why did the Secretary issue a statement concerning the April 14 resolution of the Danish Parliament on ship visits?

A: -- THE SECRETARY WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THIS, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. THE NATURE OF OUR CONCERNS IS SPELLED OUT CLEARLY IN THE STATEMENT ITSELF.

Q: In issuing a strong statement on this subject, aren't you interfering in internal Danish politics?

A: -- NO. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ONLY EXPRESSES OUR CONCERNS ON THE ISSUES AND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO UNITY AND COOPERATION. THESE SAME CONCERNS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF DENMARK.

Q: The resolution was passed over the Danish minority government's opposition. What are its implications? Is it binding?

A: -- WE REALLY DO NOT KNOW YET. THIS IS SOMETHING THE DANES WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE. THE DANES WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS THESE QUESTIONS.

Q: Are we now in a New Zealand-like situation with Denmark?

A: -- NO. THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES. THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATIONS ARE DIFFERENT. THE LANGUAGE OF POLICY STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS ARE DIFFERENT, ETC.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY in PART

DENY Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____

TS authority to: _____

CLASSIFY _____ OADR

DOWNGRADE TS to D CP C, OADR

Q: In what way might implementation of the resolution be inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its ships?

A: -- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION MAY REQUIRE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD CREATE THE ASSUMPTION THAT A VISITING SHIP DOES NOT CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS ASSUMPTION WOULD COMPROMISE THE "NEITHER-CONFIRM-NOR-DENY" POLICY.

Q: Just what is this policy, and why does the U.S. have it?

A:-- THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS A LONGSTANDING POLICY OF NEITHER CONFIRMING NOR DENYING (NCND) THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ANY GENERAL OR SPECIFIC LOCATION, INCLUDING ABOARD ANY U.S. MILITARY STATION, SHIP, VEHICLE, OR AIRCRAFT. THIS POLICY, WHICH IS COMMON AMONG THE WESTERN NUCLEAR ALLIES, HAS AS ITS FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE THE MILITARY SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- BY NEITHER CONFIRMING NOR DENYING THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THOSE WHO WOULD THREATEN THE WEAPONS, INCLUDING TERRORISTS AND SABOTEURS, ARE DENIED IMPORTANT INFORMATION. POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES THEREFORE FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTACK U.S. FORCES EFFECTIVELY.

-- BY DENYING A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY ACCURATE INFORMATION ON OUR MILITARY FORCES, WE COMPLICATE HIS MILITARY PLANNING AND REDUCE HIS CHANCE FOR A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK. THE GREATER THE UNCERTAINTY AN AGGRESSOR FACES, THE GREATER THE RISKS IN A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK, AND THE MORE LIKELY DETERRENCE WILL BE SUSTAINED.

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-- THE WESTERN POLICY OF DETERRENCE IS BASED ON A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. BY REDUCING A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY'S CHANCES OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR UNITS, WE HAVE GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYING ALL UNITS AND A GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYING THEM IF THE NEED SHOULD EVER ARISE. ✓

-- NCND IS THUS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF OUR POLICY OF DETERRENCE. ✓

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