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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

STRATCOM'S VIEW

OPR: STRATCOM/J-53/J-54
DATE: 23 NOV 92
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(U) The purpose of the briefing "Strategic Nuclear Forces: STRATCOM's View" is to address the implications of the Washington Summit Agreement (WSA), to summarize and provide alternatives to the issues brought forward at our force structure conferences and to provide a USSTRATCOM preference for the future of strategic nuclear forces which is compliant with the Summit Agreement.

Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen

FORCE STRUCTURE BRIEFING NOTES
USSTRATCOM briefing given to SECDEF + CJCS in Nov. 92.

WSA STRATEGIC FORCE OPTIONS
OVERVIEW

- WHY A NEW POSITION
- ISSUES
- STRATCOM'S PREFERRED SOLUTION

(U) First, we will review what is necessary to comply with the June agreement and what is important from our warfighter's perspective. Secondly, we will present the major issues (military, political and programmatic) which will directly impact USSTRATCOM, the services and component commands. Finally, we will provide USSTRATCOM's view on how these issues should be resolved, a view derived by looking at the issues from a warfighter's perspective.

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FACTORS DRIVING STUDY

- ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE REQUIREMENT STUDY
- WASHINGTON SUMMIT AGREEMENT (WSA) OF JUN 92
- OSD CONCERN OVER FUTURE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
- STRATCOM RESPONSIBILITY TO ARTICULATE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

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(U) Why did we undertake this effort and what did we hope to achieve? To, first of all, determine our requirement for the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). From mid-June to approximately the end of July, we accomplished a target-based, weapons system capability study in response to Air Force, JCS, and OSD questions on how many ACM we could justify.

(U) Secondly, we needed to evaluate options which would enable us to comply with the Bush-Yeltsin Washington Summit Agreement on arms control while still adhering to START Treaty limits.

(U) Third, in light of the START Treaty, the Washington Summit Agreement, and efforts to resize the force because of fiscal realities, OSD was initiating efforts to conduct an in-depth study of the strategic nuclear forces. Such a study was viewed by both the Secretary of the Air Force and the Joint Staff as a USSTRATCOM responsibility.

(U) Finally, the Implementation Plan establishing USSTRATCOM states that CINCSTRAT's specific duties include the "establishment of force requirements" and outline his responsibilities in part as "planning, developing and articulating force requirements to support" the STRATCOM mission.

(U) To deal with these events, CINCSTRAT invited representatives from the Joint, Air and OPNAV Staff, Air Combat Command, CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC staffs to participate in a series of conferences intended to produce a preferred USSTRATCOM force structure. The purpose of the conferences was to understand the arms control initiatives, the service programs and issues and provide a format for exchange of information.

WHAT IS REQUIRED?

- REVIEW THE FY93 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET STRATEGIC FORCE / PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR INITIATIVES II / SERVICE POMS
- SATISFY THE START AND WASHINGTON SUMMIT AGREEMENT LIMITS
- ADVOCATE A WARFIGHTER'S PERSPECTIVE
- CONSIDER THE BUDGET REALITIES

(U) In determining what is required to meet the WSA, we first reviewed the FY93 President's Budget force as modified by the Presidential Nuclear Inititatives II (PNI II)and the service POMs to benchmark the direction of strategic nuclear forces prior to the Summit Agreement. We then looked at the requirements to meet the WSA and START limits. We addressed our need to advocate the warfighter's perspective. And finally, we considered the budget realities which will affect the services and component commands as they try to satisfy STRATCOM's warfighting requirements.

STRATEGIC FORCES
FY93 PB + BILATERAL PNI II + FY94 POM



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(U) (S) Since the 93 PB but before the WSA, strategic force structure has been influenced by two key factors: PNI II and the FY94 POM inputs. Illustrated are the results of these actions. The WSA limit is also indicated on the slide. Please note that the WSA line portrays the total number of weapons accountable and includes SSBNs in overhaul and Back-up Authorized Inventory (BAI) aircraft. The slide also includes the fact-of-life decommit of the MMII in FY92. The specific unilateral initiatives of PNI II stopped B-2 production at 20, canceled the SICBM program and terminated the production of W88 SLBM warheads. Additionally, Peacekeeper missile procurement is halted and the ACM buy is capped at 640. The bilateral initiatives of PNI II were keyed to CIS elimination of land-based MIRVs and would result in an approximately 1/3 reduction in the SLBMs, reorientation of the B-1 to a conventional bomber, reduction of warheads on the MMIII to one RV and elimination of Peacekeeper.

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WASHINGTON SUMMIT AGREEMENT (WSA)

FORCE REDUCTION LIMITS

	PHASE I (EIF + 7 YRS)	PHASE II (CY2003)
TOTAL WARHEADS (WH)	3800 - 4250	3000 - 3500
MIRVED ICBM WH	1200	0
HEAVY ICBM WH	650	0
SLBM WH	2160	1750

- HEAVY BOMBERS COUNT AS EQUIPPED
- HEAVY BOMBERS, NOT TO EXCEED 100, THAT WERE NEVER EQUIPPED FOR LONG RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMS AND THAT ARE REORIENTED TO CONVENTIONAL ROLES WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE OVERALL TOTAL

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(U) WSA provides for a 4250 total warhead limit in Phase I which we expect o reach by the year 2000, and a 3500 total warhead limit by 2003. MIRVed ICBMs are to be eliminated by 2003, a goal expressed in the President's Nuclear Inititatives in Sept 91 and Jan 92. SLBM warheads are limited to 2160 in Phase I and 1750 in Phase II. Heavy bombers, not to exceed 100, that were never equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs and that are reoriented to the conventional role will not count against the overall total warhead limit. Practically, this allows for conventional use of the B-1B as long as these aircraft are not located at bases where heavy bomber nuclear weapons are stored.

(U) WSA builds on START, which was ratified by Congress on 1 Oct 92 and by the Supreme Soviet Legislative Body on 3 Nov 92. STARTprovides the basic definitions, procedures for verification and conversion/elimination and counting rules, which with some modifications will be followed under WSA. A START counting rule modification is that ALL systems count "as equipped" rather than discounted at 10 for cruise missile carrying bombers and 1 for penetrating bombers. The START provision which restricts downloading to only MMIII and two other existing systems will still apply. Practically speaking, the two "other" systems will be C-4 and D-5. Furthermore, once SSBNs are downloaded and officially attributed at a specified number of RVs, START precludes uploading the number of RVs to a higher level.

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WSA PHASE II

- RETIRE PEACEKEEPER
- DE-MIRV MMIII TO SINGLE RV
- DEPLOY NO MORE THAN 1750 SLBMS
- PROCURE 20 B-2

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(S) The question before us is: What is ultimately required to satisfy WSA and START in Phase II? This slide shows what the legs of the TRIAD will generally look like at the end of Phase II. [

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] It is important to point out that the number of delivery systems and configurations for the Trident and the B-52H are omitted. There are some issues which directly impact this determination and we will present those shortly.

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(S) With an understanding how the strategic force structure equation has shifted from the benchmark of the FY93 President's Budget through PNI II and FY94 POM initiatives, and with the direction of the Washington Summit Agreement, we provide our perspective as a warfighting command.

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WARFIGHTER'S PERSPECTIVE

FLEXIBILITY → RETAIN WEAPON PLATFORMS

- TARGET CHARACTERISTICS
- PLANNING INEFFICIENCIES/CONSTRAINTS
- SPECIAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
- CRUISE MISSILE SUITABILITY
- SUPPORT CONSTRAINTS

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STRATEGIC FORCE OPTIONS
OVERVIEW

- WHY A NEW POSITION
- ISSUES
- STRATCOM'S PREFERRED SOLUTION



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(U) Noting that flexibility is key to planning, we also recognize that real world realities come into play. Programmatic and fiscal realities impact the composition and drawdown associated with achieving the WSA force structure levels. In considering force structure alternatives we addressed how our recommendations might impact those decisions and issues facing the services and component commands. The following summarizes the issues which were the focal points of the force structure conferences held at STRATCOM.

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ISSUES
BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

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- B-52H NUCLEAR CONFIGURATION
- AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC)
- B-2 NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION
- B-1B CONVENTIONAL UPGRADE

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(S) The WSA issues which affect the bombers are fairly extensive and interrelated. First, the obvious conclusion which most people jumped to was to maximize ballistic missile warheads because of their day-to-day alert availability. In fact, what we discovered was a problem which served as a catalyst to have us explore all issues in depth because of various subtleties associated with arms control, Triad viability, political and programmatic constraints. This specific problem was the "bomber bottleneck". [

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(S) Since the ACM can only be carried externally on the B-52H the number of ACM is also directly tied to the number of available airframes and the types of modifications performed to allow external or internal cruise missile carriage. [

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ISSUES

BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

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- [redacted]
- B-52H NUCLEAR CONFIGURATION
- AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC)
- B-2 NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION
- B-1B CONVENTIONAL UPGRADE

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ISSUES

BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

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- B-52H NUCLEAR CONFIGURATION
- AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC)
- B-2 NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION
- B-1B CONVENTIONAL UPGRADE

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BOMBER COSTS
IN MILLIONS, THEN YEAR DOLLARS



(U) Achieving the 47/47 split configuration from a cost perspective is minimal. Removing the internal ALCM capability from 47 B-52H is estimated by AFMC to cost $1.5M. The modification consists of removing the Common Strategic Rotary Launcher (CSRL) and covering the mounting holes. This modification may be accomplished without depot team support.

(U) Removing the external capability from 47 aircraft (identified by ACC as those scheduled to receive heavy conventional upgrade provided by the Integrated Conventional Stores Management System (ICSMS) requires depot level support. As these aircraft enter scheduled depot maintenance, the cruise missile integration wiring will be removed from the wings. Additionally, depot personnel will remove the cruise missile pylon attach points from the wing and de-mod the stub pylons for cruise missile carriage. The current schedule will enter the first aircraft to be modified in FY95/1. The last aircraft will return from the depot in FY96/4. If the nuclear capability were removed during the ICSMS mod installation the cost would be $4.1M. Removal of external carriage capability during a separate modification increases the costs to approximately $7M. ACC and Air Staff PEMs and the program manager in Oklahoma City have agreed to support a delay in the decision to remove external carriage capability until the FY96 POM.

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ISSUES

SSBN FORCE STRUCTURE

- NUMBER OF SSBNS

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- DOWNLOADING
  - CAN NOT UPLOAD UNDER START
  - WEAPONS STORAGE

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(S) We also looked at the impacts of Navy decisions on STRATCOM requirements. The first issue is the number of SSBNs.[

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(S) The baseline D-5 Backfit provides for the new D-5 missile and full missile processing and training capability.[

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(S) The Life Extension program provides for refurbishment of the C-4 missiles and weapons system . The schedule is similar to that for the Backfit, coinciding with planned refueling overhauls.

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ISSUES

SSBN FORCE STRUCTURE

- NUMBER OF SSBNS

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- DOWNLOADING
  - CAN NOT UPLOAD UNDER START
  - WEAPONS STORAGE

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U~~(S)~~ We have not addressed the issue of potential conversion of Trident submarines to other missions (e.g. SSGN configuration for regional conflict).

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U~~(S)~~ Should the decision be made that a Trident force of 18 SSBNs is not feasible due to political and fiscal realities, then a careful decision should be made on the bottom line number of SSBNs. This chosen submarine force must be capable of full target coverage in both oceans, large operating areas, and maximum reconstitution should the international political scene take a turn for the worse.

(S) Downloading is an important issue for two reasons. First, since START prohibits uploading it may become critical to avoid committing to a specified level of RVs until a decision on the number of SSBNs is firm. Secondly, the weapons storage capacity must be considered for any downloading scenario.

SSBN DECISION TIMING

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

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(S) The most encompassing SSBN issue pertains to the backfit/life extension decision.

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SSBN DECISION TIMING



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U ~~(S)~~ The uploading restriction should not be a factor if the backfit/life extension decision is made in FY94.

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SLBM COSTS
IN MILLIONS, THEN YEAR DOLLARS

PROGRAM	PRIOR YEAR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TO COMPLETE	TOTAL
C-4 LIFE EXTENSION		100	157	331	412	474	521	11,019	13,014
BASELINE D-5 BACKFIT		100	157	209	290	523	843	12,062	14,184
RESTRUCTURED D-5 BACKFIT								DETAILED DATA UNAV.	
MISSILE TUBE ELIMIN NOTE 1			125		300	300	300	300	1,325

NOTE 1 - $125M ONE TIME COST
$150M PER SHIP - FY97 START/CY02 COMPLETION - 8 BOATS

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(U) This slide provides previous cost projections for the C-4 refurbishment, baseline D-5 backfit and elimination of the C-4 missiles and tubes. The Life Extension total cost is approximately $13B which provides funding for the navigational mods, Strategic Weapon System (SWS), the missile mods, flight test instrumentation and O&M-N. The D-5 Baseline Backfit cost is approximately $14.2B. The D-5 baseline funding includes R&D, missile and weapon system procurement, O&M-N and continued C-4 missile flight tests until the D-5 conversion is complete. Detailed funding data is not available for the Restructured Backfit program although initial estimates indicate a cost that is $2-3B less than the Baseline program. The Restructured D-5 program accelerates backfit and cuts back on some "extras" associated with the missile processing and training/weapons facility in Bangor. For the undesirable contingency which would result in fewer than 18 SSBNs, the estimated cost for missile tube elimination is $150M per ship and an initial one time cost of $125M.



(U) The Navy has provided these funding profiles depicting the relative costs of the 3 backfit and life extension alternatives.

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ISSUES

ICBM FORCE STRUCTURE

- PEACEKEEPER DRAWDOWN
  - [ ] B1
  - •• PDM APPROVAL OF FUNDING TO PHASE II
    - [ ] B1, B5 USSC
- MMIII MODERNIZATION
  - •• GUIDANCE UPGRADE
  - •• LIFE EXTENSION

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(S) STRATCOM is also affected by the ICBM issues

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ISSUES

ICBM FORCE STRUCTURE

- PEACEKEEPER DRAWDOWN
  - [redacted] B1
  - PDM APPROVAL OF FUNDING TO PHASE II [redacted] B1, B5 USSC
- MMIII MODERNIZATION
  - GUIDANCE UPGRADE
  - LIFE EXTENSION

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(U) The most recent PDM dealing with the program deleted plans to enter EMD for Phase II. It does allow for a downselect to one contractor at the completion of the ATTD in 95, and provides some funding for further development of the advanced inertial measurement system through FY99, which preserves the option to deploy Phase II in the future. IOC would be approximately 4 to 5 years after a decision to enter EMD is made. Based on current funding, if EMD is pushed back to the year 2000, IOC would would be sometime in FY04 or 05.

(U) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the "Future Guidance System for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles" mission need statement (MNS), otherwise known as the MMIII Guidance Replacement Program, on 5 Nov 92. This MNS includes both phases of the program. This program will go to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in the May-Jun timeframe.

(U)The MMIII Life Extension program runs through 2010 and includes motor wash out, REACT, RIVET MILE, support equipment and the Single RV platform.

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ICBM DECISION TIMING



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~~(S)~~ STRATCOM's recent NWRS input (July 92) requested its availability through 2001, which is reflected in the 10 Sept 92 draft Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM).

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ICBM COSTS
IN MILLIONS, THEN YEAR DOLLARS

PROGRAM	PRIOR YEAR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	TO COMPLETE	TOTAL
MISC MMIII LIFE EXT									3,620
MMIII GUIDANCE UPGRADE PHASE I	63	97	134	191	361	297	234	213	1,590
PHASE II			20	28	29	30	32	2,616	2,755
MK 21 CONVERSION						TBD	TBD	TBD	196
RETIRE PEACEKEEPER				6	24.7				30.7

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(U)This slide shows the current cost projections for the ICBMs. The life extension program cost is approximately $3.6B through the year 2010 and is intended to extend the life of the system to approximately 2020. The life extension includes motor wash out, the single RV platform, REACT, support equipment, and RIVET MILE. Phase 1 of the MMIII Guidance Upgrade is funded at $1.6B. The JROC has approved Phase 2 funding with a total program cost estimate of approximately $2.7B. MK21 conversion requires completion of the Phase1 upgrade and the SRV platform. Additional software compatibility and support equipment costs are estimated at $196M. Peacekeeper retirement requires construction of additional booster storage facilities, additional stage handling equipment, and, depending on MMIII warhead replacement timing, a potential procurement of additional RV containers at a cost of approximately $30.7M. Ogden currently has some Peacekeeper storage facilities and, with the completion of another building, will have the capability to store 29 boosters by the spring of 93.

STRATEGIC FORCE OPTIONS
OVERVIEW

- WHY A NEW POSITION
- ISSUES
- → STRATCOM'S PREFERRED SOLUTION

(U) Now we will look at STRATCOM's preferred solution for a future force structure which is compliant with the WSA. We will also provide recommendations dealing with the Triad issues which have just been presented. These STRATCOM preferences satisfy the projected warfighting requirements, address the planners need for flexibility, and are realistic expectations of the services and component commands.

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STRATCOM WARFIGHTING PREFERENCES

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- MAINTAIN BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

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STRATCOM WARFIGHTING PREFERENCES

SLBM FORCE



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STRATCOM WARFIGHTING PREFERENCES

ICBM FORCE



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STRATCOM PREFERENCE
WSA PHASE I AND PHASE II

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

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~~(S)~~ STRATCOM's preferences on the issues regarding the Trident and the B-52Hs would result in these Phase I and Phase II force structures.

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STRATEGIC FORCES
WSA - REDUCE PEACEKEEPER EARLY



(U)Illustrated are the available weapons based on our recommendations. The WSA reference line depicts the total number of weapons, to include overhaul and BAI.

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FIXED TARGET BASE
PROJECTION



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WEAPONS REQUIRED
PROJECTION



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STRATCOM PREFERENCE
FORCE TAB - TAI



B1
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USSC

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32 - 11/19/92

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USSC

BACKUP SLIDES

~~SECRET~~ Unclassified

ISSUES

BOMBER BOTTLENECK



B1
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34 - 11/19/92

There 2 together secret

Secret

31
c
Verbage by itself is not

SECRET Unclassified

B-52H AIRFRAME ALTERNATIVES

[ ] — B1 USSC



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USSC

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STRATCOM PREFERENCE
FORCE TAB - TAI



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USSC



U (~~S~~) This slide depicts the new B-2 nuclear certification schedule and the B-52Hs modified in accordance with the ICSMS schedule.

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PHASE II ACCELERATION
TIMING



B1
B5
USSC

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38 - 11/19/82

U
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USSC

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B5
USSC

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WARFIGHTER'S PERSPECTIVE



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